The Christians say:

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We believe fully that Allāh is just. As such, the contention that He would expect any community of people to follow a person that was never sent to them is completely antithetical to His justice. In addition to this, our community was never even granted a book from him (or any other person) inviting to his religion in their language.

We can answer this claim with the following points:

The Very Existence of Their Supposed Refutations Against Islām Proves Their Ability to Understand Arabic

It is most inappropriate for the writer of this treatise¹ to make such a statement claiming that none of the Christians understand Arabic. Here, they have clearly demonstrated their understanding of the Arabic (letter) that was sent to them. Moreover, after reading and becoming fully acquainted with it, they have then attempted to debate and argue concerning it (demonstrating their complete understanding of its contents). This proves that they are fully capable of understanding this foreign language. This fact is supported by their communicating it to their people (in their native tongue), which would only make the repudiation of this claimed injustice increasingly obvious.

The Christians’ Familiarity with Arabic and other Non-Native Languages of the Scriptures

They are fully capable of understanding their own scriptures recorded in Latin, Syriac, Coptic as well as other languages, translating those scriptures into Arabic for the benefit of Arab Christians. If the responsibility of accepting the message of Christianity applies to those Arab Christians by means of this translation into the Arabic language, then how could the responsibility of accepting the message of Islām not similarly apply to the Romans by simply translating from Arabic into their language? In fact, this responsibility should be considered even more deserving in consideration of the fact that Arabic is more widely spoken than the language of the Romans, especially following Islam’s inception.

Moreover, the conveyance, expression, and the ability to communicate using Arabic is far superior to that of any other language anyways.² Consequently, the linguistic excellence of Arabic and its widespread proliferation would ease the ability to convey (i.e., translate) it to non-native speakers.

Furthermore, these very same Christian scholars peruse books on a wide range of subjects including medicine, mathematics, and philosophy — all written in Arabic by authors that are themselves non-native Greek, Roman, and other speakers. What prevents these scholars from similarly becoming acquainted with the Arabic Qurʾān, with its interpretations (tafsīr) and narrations of the Prophet (صلى الله عليه وسلم) in Hebrew? Although since these narrations from the Prophet (صلى الله عليه وسلم) are in Arabic, learning the original language of delivery is more befitting to truly grasp the meaning of the statements expressed by him (صلى الله عليه وسلم).

The Christians Claim Injustice Without Being Able to Define It

As for the ‘justice’ mentioned in their claim, it should be noted that their people have three separate views on what it constitutes.

Among them are those that believe that every predestined event that has ever occurred represents the very manifestation of His justice.
While others among them believe that any act considered just by His servants is similarly considered just by Him.

Both of these views are considered quite feeble.

The third opinion in this matter is that justice is represented by rewarding the good-doer for his righteous acts without diminishment of that reward in the slightest, and by refusal to punish any person without his perpetration of sin.

Justice Is for the Servant to Be Commanded Within the Scope of His Capabilities

It is also a widely accepted fact that it is perfectly plausible (and just) for a servant of Allāh to be commanded with the implementation of any act that falls under his capabilities. This is a sentiment that is fully agreed upon by Muslims, Jews, and Christians. It is also perfectly plausible that that servant may harbour dislike for this act,³ as [the attainment of] Paradise is surrounded by the dogged execution of such disliked acts while [punishment in] the Fire of Hell is surrounded by the perpetration of sin driven by false desires.⁴ In this vein, the Children of Israel — among them the Christians — were commanded to perform a multitude of different acts that were disliked to them, because of which they experienced great hardship. Considering this:

What could reasonably prevent them from being responsible for the commands and prohibitions relayed to them in Arabic that are simply translated and clarified to them by the Arabs?

While the Arabs — the people in whose language the Qurʾān was revealed — are widely accessible as a nation, being extensively dispersed across the earth. Among those very same Arabs are countless Christians anyways, fluent in Arabic. As for the Roman (Christians), they have a clear example and precedence set by those who have accepted Islām among their non-native peers like the Persians, Turks, Indians, Berbers, Abbasinyans and many others. In this way, they are fully capable of gaining complete awareness of Allāh’s commands and have the ability to fully enact them, just as these other groups have similarly done (despite being non-Arabs). In fact, the Roman (Christians) are more capable of becoming acquainted with Islamic knowledge and teachings than the other nations mentioned here [in consideration of their extensive perusal of Arabic writings on other secular subjects]. Then, what plausible justification could they provide that would prevent Allāh from commanding them to seek an understanding of Islām?

Commands Inherently Stipulate the Fulfilment of Facilitating Acts

Any obligatory act (here, accepting the message of Islām) that itself cannot be fulfilled except by enacting another, separate act that facilitates it (here, learning Arabic or seeking its meaning from translation) would render this secondary facilitating act similarly obligatory provided the servant of Allāh is capable of it. This principle is fully agreed upon by the Muslims, Jews and Christians. The point of contention surrounding this principle is related only to whether this secondary facilitating act should be considered independently obligatory.⁵

The crux of this issue in this context is that if Allāh obligates the fulfilment of a particular responsibility, but that obligation can only be performed by seeking acquaintance with a particular field of knowledge, then seeking that knowledge is itself an obligation. Therefore, if the servant of Allāh can only gain awareness of Allāh’s commands by first learning the meaning of His words which are in a language foreign to him, but he is fully capable of learning the meaning of His statements despite this or by seeking their translation in his own language, it then becomes obligatory upon him to seek that knowledge.

The Parable of Kings and Foreign Dignitaries Communicating in Foreign Languages Refutes the Christian Claim

Just as is the case with correspondence sent from one king to another in a language that is foreign to the recipient, he would seek a translator capable of conveying the meaning of the sender’s words. It would be most unbefitting for him to simply say: ‘You have not sent someone who communicates using my language’, while he is fully capable of understanding the sender’s intent by simply seeking a translation. How then could such a statement ever be made concerning the Lord of Everything in Existence? For even if the kings of this worldly life were to command their constituents or armies in a foreign language which they are fully able to learn — either by learning the language itself or seeking a translator — this king would not be considered as having oppressed them in any way. How then could they ever deign to claim that the Lord of Everything in Existence has oppressed them when the very same circumstance would not be considered a form of oppression with the creation?

Considering this, if a king was to grant certain rights to his constituents over others, or they were engaged in oppressing one another, this king would be obligated to treat the oppressed with equity, dispatching to the oppressor one who shall demand their return to all that is just and fair, ensuring that this oppressor is punished accordingly should he continue his tyranny while he is fully capable of understanding the commands of his king either by means of a translation or some other method. This represents the very essence of true justice.

True Injustice Is Refusal to Accept Islām

Injustice, in actuality, is to abandon mankind while they deny the rights of Allāh and His servants. For this reason, Allāh has sent His messengers and revealed His books comprising all that is just. As the Most High said:

لَقَدْ أَرْسَلْنَا رُسُلَنَا بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ وَأَنزَلْنَا مَعَهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَالْمِيزَانَ لِيَقُومَ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ

“Indeed We have sent Our messengers with clear proofs, and revealed with them the scripture and the balance (justice) that mankind may uphold justice.”
(Al-Ḥadīd, 57:25)

It is therefore most inappropriate for anyone to whom a messenger is sent, who is fully capable of understanding the message being relayed by means of that messenger (through translation or any other avenue) to simply reject the revealed legislation which is the very manifestation of the justice (mentioned in the āyah), as delivered by Allāh’s messenger. Consider that this refusal stems from the mere fact that the language of the messenger in question happens to be different to the language of the recipient, while there exists a plethora of ways that could be employed to facilitate understanding the message.

The Christians Readily Utilise Language Acquisition and Translation for Worldly Benefit

In worldly matters that promote prosperity, they employ every means at their disposal to gain understanding, in spite of it being conveyed in a foreign tongue. By means of such methods, they form treaties using interpreters that relay information between concerned parties, participating in extensive and detailed correspondence between countries in order to cultivate their respective societies, or for personal gain. In this vein, they show no hesitation using translators to relay information to them. All the while, the magnanimity of religious affairs far outweighs worldly affairs. How then do they refuse to seek an understanding of what has been relayed to them? How could any worldly matter ever be granted precedence over a religious one? Except in the demented estimation of the one whose heart has been rendered heedless of the remembrance of Allāh, following his own wicked desires, while actively refusing to remember Him. Such people desire nothing but the life of this world; this is the limit of their understanding:

فَأَعْرِضْ عَن مَّن تَوَلَّىٰ عَن ذِكْرِنَا وَلَمْ يُرِدْ إِلَّا الْحَيَاةَ الدُّنْيَا

“Therefore withdraw (O’ Muḥammad (صلى الله عليه وسلم)) from him who turns away from Our reminder (this Qurʿān) and desires nothing but the life of this world.”
(Al-Najm, 53:29)

The Most High also said:

وَاصْبِرْ نَفْسَكَ مَعَ الَّذِينَ يَدْعُونَ رَبَّهُم بِالْغَدَاةِ وَالْعَشِيِّ يُرِيدُونَ وَجْهَهُ ۖ وَلَا تَعْدُ عَيْنَاكَ عَنْهُمْ تُرِيدُ زِينَةَ الْحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا ۖ وَلَا تُطِعْ مَنْ أَغْفَلْنَا قَلْبَهُ عَن ذِكْرِنَا وَاتَّبَعَ هَوَاهُ وَكَانَ أَمْرُهُ فُرُطًا

“And keep yourself (O’ Muḥammad (صلى الله عليه وسلم)) patiently with those who call on their Lord (i.e. your companions) morning and afternoon, seeking His Face, and let not your eyes overlook them, desiring the pomp and glitter of the life of the world; and obey not him whose heart We have made heedless of Our Remembrance, one who follows his own lusts and whose affair (deeds) has been lost.”
(Al-Kahf, 18:28)

The Christians Have No Claim to the Justice of Allāh When They Have Committed the Ultimate Injustice: Shirk (Polytheism)

It is exceedingly surprising that the Christians allege that the sending of the Messenger (صلى الله عليه وسلم) speaking a language besides their own is a form of oppression that is itself antithetical to all that is just and fair, while they themselves have attributed Him to one of the greatest, most magnanimous forms of oppression (i.e., polytheism). This is despite what they espouse of oppression never being ascribed to Him. In fact, they have attributed Him to that which no other nation has ever deigned to claim (i.e, having a son). Just as they additionally insult, revile and curse Him in a manner unlike any other nation in existence (i.e., the trinity). It is in consideration of this that they are the furthest nation from believing in anything remotely resembling His oneness (tawḥīd), recognising His gloriousness, or truly praising or commemorating Him. This is inherent in their claim that when Ādam (عليه السلام) ate from the forbidden tree in Paradise, his Lord was angered by his act and punished him. Then, that very same punishment remained continually owing, perpetuated throughout all the generations of humankind until the time when the Messiah was (allegedly) crucified (as an expiation!). That during this entire time the progeny of Ādam were being held captive by Iblīs such that the souls of all those that died before this alleged crucifixion were relegated directly to Hell (Jahannam) to abide therein as captives of Iblīs, to the extent that they even claim this to be the reality of the prophets Nūḥ, Ibrāhīm, Mūsá, Dāwūd, Sulaymān and others following their demise.

Consider the well-known circumstance of Ibrāhīm whose father was a disbeliever but, despite this, Ibrāhīm was never held responsible for the sin of his father. How then could they claim that — while not being held responsible for the sins of his direct father — he is indeed responsible for the sin committed by Ādam, his father spanning back eons. Then, this is assuming Ādam never repented for his perpetrated sin, except that Allāh has informed us that he (عليه السلام) did indeed repent.⁶

Then they claim that the crucifixion — which is itself representative of a grave sin and manifest transgression — acted as a means by which Ādam and all of his progeny gained absolution from the punishment of the blazing Fire and that it successfully punished Iblīs. Even though Iblīs never ceased in disobedience to Allāh (before and after the crucifixion), because of which he remains deserving of punishment, just as he is continuously deserving of punishment extending from the time he refused to prostrate to Ādam and subsequently whispered to him to eat from the forbidden fruit until the time that the Messiah was sent as a messenger. Anyways, the Lord of Iblīs is fully capable of punishing him (regardless of a crucifixion or lack thereof).

As for the children of Ādam, they are undeserving of punishment of any kind on account of the sin perpetrated by their father, Ādam. Any nation that could ever postulate such a ridiculous and preposterous claim — which would be the source of amusement for any truly intellectual group, which would not appropriately be ascribed to even the most oppressive despots and severely ignorant kings — how then could the very same claimants ever genuinely believe that Allāh should, despite all this, be ascribed to absolute justice? Or that His justice stipulates that He could never command a human being to gain knowledge that is fully within his ability to learn, that also proffers immense rectification and reform of his worldly life and hereafter. Rather, they allege that such [a plausible and ordinary] command being directed at them [is so unfair] that it actually obligates their complete rejection of Allāh’s book [the Qurʿān] as well as all His messengers. While also necessitating that they persist in their corrupt manipulation [of the meanings and words] of the Old Testament while completely falsifying the last revealed book under the guise that it comprises that which opposes the message of Mūsá, ʿĪsá and the rest of the prophets and messengers.

The Christians Have No Claim to the Justice of Allāh When They Have Committed the Ultimate Injustice: The Alleged Crucifixion of Jesus Is an Expiation for the Progeny of Ādam Due to His Unatoned Sin

Then the Christians claim that the disbelievers managed to crucify Jesus who, according to them, comprises both humanness and godliness in one being, sacrificed as a veritable ploy that would ultimately facilitate Iblīs’ punishment. They allege that Jesus managed to temporarily conceal himself from Iblīs such that he was ignorant of his plight, then he allowed his own enemies to capture and beat him, spitting in his face, adorning him with a crown of thorns, before finally crucifying him. That he [pretended to] express his anguish and despair at his fate, saying: “O’ my God! Why hast thou forsaken me?” (allegedly) making this statement to deceive Iblīs, hiding the true nature of the event from him. That during this entire time, Iblīs was completely ignorant of the fact that Jesus was in actual fact Allāh Himself or His son! That he coveted the capturing of Jesus’ soul in order to surrender it to the raging Fire in the same manner that he had previously captured the souls of Nūḥ, Ibrāhīm, Mūsá and the rest of the prophets and those who believed in them. They allege that the crucifixion provided Jesus with an expiation before his Lord, such that he asked Iblīs: “How has it been deemed permissible for you to capture my soul?” to which Iblīs will answer: “In relation to your transgression [i.e., that of Ādam (عليه السلام)]”. Then Jesus will answer: “I have not perpetrated a transgression of the variety perpetrated by the prophets. For they all engaged in sins which rendered their souls most deserving of damnation in Hell. As for myself, I am completely guiltless.” In this way, they claim that Allāh managed to bring a convincing case to bear in opposition to Iblīs, that only then was it deemed permissible for Allāh to bring forth Iblīs and punish him, and in doing so Ādam’s entire progeny were finally granted respite from perpetual damnation in the raging Fire.

The Various Forms of Injustice Inherent in the Story of the Crucifixion

These claims comprise blatant falsehood and attribute manifest oppression to Allāh, the elucidation of which is lengthy. Regarding this, we say that their claim represents a clear insult and criticism of Allāh’s knowledge, His wisdom and justice. Here, they have insulted Him in a singular manner that no other nation has ever deigned to, clarified in the following points:

1. If Iblīs is able to capture the souls of Ādam’s progeny on account of the sin perpetrated by their father, then there should be no difference between the humanness of the Messiah and the rest of humankind. If, however, he is capturing their souls in relation to the sins they actually perpetrated themselves, then he has simultaneously not captured their souls for the sin of their father. Despite this, they allege that Iblīs is able to capture their souls because of the sins of their father only.
2. The human beings born after the Messiah are the same as those born before him, so how could it be deemed permissible for Iblīs to capture the souls of these predecessors but not their descendants? They are all alike one another in terms of their relation to Ādam. In fact, these descendants are guilty of the perpetration of even more magnanimous crimes than their predecessors from among the prophets. Considering this, how could it be permissible for Iblīs to capture the souls of the prophets that precede the Messiah, while he is absolutely unable to punish any of the disbelievers or tyrants that were subsequent to him?
3. We should state that Iblīs’ act of capturing the souls of Ādam’s progeny and damning them to Hell should be considered either an act of oppression, or one of justice. If it represents justice, Iblīs would be undeserving of blame of any kind. If this is the case, then it would be most unbefitting for a scheme to be hatched with the goal of preventing him from the justice he aims to incorporate with those who are deserving of it. Rather, he should be fully permitted to capture the souls of everyone, regardless of whether they were created before or after the Messiah.
   
   If however this act of Iblīs represents oppression, then why has his Lord not prevented his perpetration of it prior to the Messiah? If they answer: “He was unable to”, then they have ascribed weakness and inability to Him. If instead they say: ‘He was fully able to prevent him but chose not to’, then we answer that there is no actual difference in preventing his oppression in one specific time period but not in another. Rather, if He is able to prevent his oppressive acts in one period of time, He is fully able to do so in all of them. Just as had He been unable to prevent him in one period, He would be unable to do so in all of them.
4. If Iblīs is forgiven for malfeasance before the advent of the Messiah, there would be no need to punish him and he should be considered blameless anyways. If he is not deserving of forgiveness, then he is deserving of being punished and there is no need for a scheme to be hatched in order for a case to be raised against him.
5. If we were to hypothetically acquiesce that before the crucifixion a case against Iblīs was completely non-existent, we state here that the crucifixion does not supply evidence that would bear on a potential case against him anyways. For could Iblīs not simply defend himself saying: ‘I was unaware that the human aspect of the Messiah was actually the Lord Himself. Besides, You — O’ my Lord — were the One who permitted me to capture the souls of Ādam’s progeny and damn them to the raging Fire. The soul of the Messiah was just another one of them (as far I was concerned). I was ignorant of your — or your son’s — unification with him. If I had known, I would have glorified and attested to his greatness instead. Thus, I am most deserving of being pardoned for my actions. It is most impermissible for You to oppress me.’
6. We say that Iblīs, at this point, could then say: ‘O’ my Lord! I am only mistaken in my attempt to capture this one human [i.e., the Messiah]. As for the rest of Ādam’s children, I am fully permitted to capture and incarcerate their souls in Hell just as I previously captured the souls of those born before the advent of the Messiah. I am justified in this capture because of the sin originally perpetrated by their father (i.e., Ādam), or on account of their own respective misdeeds.’ In this way, if the Christians have spoken the truth in this matter, Allāh has no case to bear against Iblīs.
7. Suppose that Ādam and his children all sinned as a result of Shayṭān’s beatification and adornment of misdeeds to them, does the responsibility of punishing them belong to Iblīs or to Allāh? Can a truly intellectual person allege that Iblīs not only beautifies acts of malfeasance to them, but that he is also responsible for punishing them on account of those very same acts, all without any permission from Allāh? Is this view not the very same as that of the dualist Majūs who postulate that all the evil in the world — be it sins and their resulting punishments and everything else in this vein — are all the result of Iblīs’ actions only, that Allāh never decreed any of it [in His infinite wisdom], nor has He ever punished a single soul on account of its misdeeds.
   
   There should be no doubt that this view was obscurely incorporated into the Christian belief from these Majūs as evidenced by the fact that they do not narrate these notions from any revealed book, nor do they attribute it to statements made by the disciples (of Jesus). This also explains the manner in which Manichaeism comprises aspects of both Christian and Majūs religions. The leader of this sect was a man named Manes who ascribed himself to both religions. Furthermore, [Christianity] has similarly co-opted beliefs from the rest of the polytheistic religions.
8. It should be said to the Christians: ‘Is Iblīs able to punish the Children of Ādam by Allāh’s leave or without it?’ If they say: ‘It is by His leave’ then he is sinless and therefore undeserving of being the victim of a plot that would facilitate his punishment and to prevent him from continuing his actions. If, however, he is acting without the permission of Allāh, then does Allāh’s justice stipulate or prevent that his actions are fully facilitated in this way? For if such acts are permitted in one time period, there is no reason why they should not similarly be permitted in all of them. Just as if they are impermissible in one period of time, they should be deemed impermissible in all of them, and there is no difference between the eras subsequent to the Messiah and those occurring before him.
9. It should be said to the Christians: ‘Does Allāh have the ability to prevent Iblīs from his actions and punish him for them without this long-winded scheme and — provided He is able to do so — would this represent a form of justice from Him or not?’ For if He is fully able to do so and this represents a form of justice, then there is no need for Him to hatch a plot and scheme against Iblīs to achieve this purpose, nor would He himself have to be crucified nor His ‘son’.
   
   Also, if His punishment of Iblīs represents obligatory justice, then it becomes incumbent upon Him to actively prevent Iblīs’ malfeasance. Otherwise, if this justice is not an obligation, Allāh should facilitate Iblīs’ actions in all eras of time, regardless of specific periods.
   
   If they claim that Allāh is not capable of preventing Iblīs’ wrongdoing, then they have ascribed weakness and inability to the Lord with regards to his prevention of Iblīs. This claim is among the most magnanimous forms of disbelief as unanimously agreed upon by the religious, of the same ilk as that of the (Majūsī) dualist claim that the light (their worshipped entity) is unable to overcome the darkness in order to prevent its evil. It also mirrors statements made by Democritus and others who claim that: ‘The omnipotent One (God) cannot prevent a soul from entering its physical body. Rather, the soul adheres to it regardless of God’s will.’
10. The actions carried out by the disbelieving Jews of that time period should be considered either an act of obedience or disobedience to Allāh. If their actions were a form of obedience to Allāh, those Jews who carried out the (alleged) crucifixion (of Jesus) are deserving of reward from Him, honoured for their obeisance in a manner akin to the rest of those who carry out acts of His obedience. Despite this, the Christians are in unanimous agreement that those Jews are among the most sinful of mankind, referring to them as the most evil people that have ever existed among the creation. They deem the spilling of their blood and cursing them completely permissible, not condoning such treatment against any other group of people. They ardently seek to find and punish these Jews specifically in the latter days of their fasting done to commemorate the days of the crucifixion.
    
    Otherwise, if these Jews were guilty of being disobedient to Allāh by crucifying the Messiah, then is Allāh able to prevent them from this act of disobedience? If He is unable to prevent them, then He would be even more unable to prevent Iblīs from oppressing future generations of Ādam’s progeny. If He is fully able to prevent them from this act of disobedience, then He would be fully able to prevent Iblīs’s malfeasance without the need to hatch a long-winded scheme and plot in order to achieve this goal. Then, if His facilitation of these Jews crucifying the Messiah is actually considered an act of goodness, then His facilitation of Iblīs oppressing the progeny of Ādam in the past and future should all similarly be considered an act of goodness from Him. That being the case, there should be no need for an elaborate scheme deployed against Iblīs anyways.
    
    Finally, please recognise that there are a great multitude of individual aspects of the Christian religion that may unequivocally be used to indicate an ideology that is wholly corrupt. Any truly intellectual who conceptualises their belief system, logically deducing the ideas indicated therein, is immediately faced with its manifest corruption. The intention here is to highlight their duplicity and contradictory nature in that they excuse themselves for their abandonment of belief in Allāh’s book, His Messenger (صلى الله عليه وسلم), and His religion, claiming that He is just and fair, that He would never order them to enact that which they are woefully unable to carry out and that He only commands their execution of actions that they are fully able to incorporate. All the while they have attributed a form of oppression to Him that no other group among all the Children of Adam has ever deigned to accuse Him of (Trinitarianism) which is further clarified in the following:
11. With regards to the notion of oppression, one may either adopt the position of the Jahmiyyah al-Mujbirah who claim that Allāh does whatever He wills, but His actions are completely devoid of any form of wisdom, reason or justification. Or one may adopt the position espoused by the Qadariyyah who claim that justice is obligatory upon Him, and that His justice must exactly mirror whatever is considered just by His creation. Or one may alternatively postulate that He is just, oppression and injustice in all its forms are most unbefitting of Him, but His justice manifests in a manner unlike that of His creation. These are three views adopted by mankind in this matter.
    
    If one was to adopt the first view (i.e., an arbitrary decree devoid of wisdom), it would stipulate that it is fully permissible for Iblīs to subjugate all of Ādam’s progeny to his will while they are innocent of sin, and that he may freely punish them in their guiltless state. In this way, there would be absolutely no requirement for a scheme to be hatched in order to prevent him from this subjugation.
    
    As for the second opinion (i.e., Allāh’s justice is exactly the same as that of the creation), it is a well-known fact that if anyone possesses multiple servants and among them is one who commands and incites the others towards sin, the master of those servants would hate this instigator. It would then be a manifestation of his justice to punish both the instigator, as well as those among his servants who actually perpetrated what was suggested. It would not be just of him to also allow the servant who invites others to sin to then also be fully able to punish those other servants freely as he wills, just as it would be similarly unjust for this master to simply allow the commander of sin to punish the progeny of those servants who refused to perpetrate the sin to which their fathers were invited.
    
    If it is alleged that this instigator (who invited the other servants to sin) has the deserved right to subjugate the other servants because their fathers obeyed his call to sin, this would stipulate that he has the right to capture the first and latter generations in this way, and it is most unbefitting that the scheme be hatched in order to prevent him from his deserved right.
    
    If instead it is claimed that he has the right to capture them, but only in relation to the mistakes they themselves perpetrated (and not that of their forefathers), then he should be able to capture the first and latter generations regardless.
    
    Then, concerning the matter of Iblīs, if they allege that when he attempted to capture the Messiah’s soul (during the alleged crucifixion), it was a sin which then prevented his subsequent capturing of all souls henceforth, we respond: If that was considered a sin, it should be perceived as his most insignificant misdeed. This is because Iblīs was ignorant that he was attempting to capture the ‘human aspect of God Himself’. This is akin to a man [in war] having the right to enslave or subjugate the progeny of another, if he assumed a man among them to belong to that group while he is in fact external to it, he would not be ascribed to sin, nor would he be prevented from enslaving the rest of those who do indeed belong to that group.
    
    As for the claim that the justice of the Lord is unlike that of the creation (as in the third view) and that His justice manifests in never diminishing the reward granted to those deserving of it, nor does He punish anyone except for the sins they have perpetrated themselves, this form of justice would necessitate that He does not hold the progeny of Ādam accountable for the sin of their father. Nor would it be befitting His justice to punish the prophets for the sin of their fathers while they themselves are sinless, repenting before death from whatever sin they had perpetrated. For the state of the prophets is one of protection, preserved from ever having the sins they perpetrated established and affirmed as associated with them (by dying in a sinful state devoid of rectification). Thus, those who passed away among them have only left this world in a state of innocence from any sin that would be deserving of punishment. How then could they ever be deserving of punishment on account of a sin perpetrated by their forefathers? Even then, this could only be under the presumption that their fathers died while still continually perpetrating that sin, which is a false notion in and of itself. Then, under the presumption that those prophets whose souls were captured by Iblīs did indeed die in a sinful state for which they are deserving of punishment — even though this notion is inherently false — then those who have died after the Messiah who are not prophets are far more deserving of punishment at death than those prophets ever could be. So how could justice — which inherently stipulates equity amongst matters that are similar to one another — ever allow the prophets to be punished while those of a lower station than them or who have even died in a state of blatant disbelief be completely subverted from punishment altogether?
12. If the Lord intended by means of the crucifixion to finally erect a defence against the continual oppression perpetrated by Iblīs, then could He not have unified with some of the other sons of Ādam as a plot to foil Iblīs’ designs against the creation? He would have thus prevented Iblīs’ oppression against the first generations of mankind as well. For the prevention and staunching of immense evil is far superior to preventing only a negligible proportion of it. Do you surmise that He was completely ignorant of the evil Iblīs had been engaging in this entire time? This is a form of ascribing ignorance to God. Or that He was fully aware, but was unable to formulate a plot that could successfully stop him which is a form of ascribing inability and weakness to Him. Then what is the inherent difference between one time period and another (insofar as preventing Iblīs from his malfeasance against mankind). Or is refusal to prevent Iblīs’ acts a form of justice? If so, then what is just shall remain so regardless of the time period.

Supplement: The Islamic Judicial Perspective on Secondary Facilitating Acts

Among the scholars are those who postulate that it should be considered a standalone obligation while others negate this view, justifying their stance by highlighting that the One issuing commands here never mentioned this secondary facilitating act specifically in the context of an order. Moreover, if the one issuing orders was a person among the creation, it is most probable that he would have never even fathomed his original command stipulating the additional execution of this other, secondary act. They also point out that an obligatory act is one that, when abandoned, renders one legislatively blameworthy or causes one to be amenable to punishment in a legislative sense (whether in this life or the hereafter), or any act that when abandoned is widely considered deserving of blame (legislatively and otherwise), or any act whose abandonment is linked to general blame or punishment. Considering this, [according to these scholars] a person who abandons a secondary facilitating act is undeserving of blame, rebuke, or punishment, which would mean that the secondary act cannot be considered independently obligatory. To illustrate this, consider the example of two people obligated to perform Ḥajj but one lives close to Makkah and the other is situated far from it. If they both refuse to fulfil this obligation, the one who was situated farther away would not be deserving of a more severe punishment than the one who lived close, even though the one who lived farther would have undoubtedly had [a secondary facilitating act] of travel much more extensive than this other person. [If the punishment for the abandonment of this secondary act is not disparate based on the extent of travel, then this facilitating act must not be considered obligatory in and of itself]. This is also similar to the circumstance of two people: one who can settle his debt without selling any of his assets and the other can only settle his debt by selling some of it. If they both refuse to settle their respective debts, they would each be deserving of the same degree of punishment [i.e., the one with the secondary facilitating act of selling assets deserves the same punishment as the other that does not need to, demonstrating that this facilitating act is not obligatory as there is no extra punishment for its additional abandonment].

To settle further debate on this issue, we state that the fulfillment of secondary facilitating acts should be considered a necessary requirement for the very existence of the original command. This is because any matter whose very existence is contingent upon the existence of another, separate matter cannot possibly exist in the absence of this secondary matter. Therefore, any commanded act should be interpreted as a command to also enact anything secondary that facilitates the fulfilment of the original command, just as any prohibition cannot be abandoned except by also abandoning the acts that inevitably lead to it (even if those other acts are not specifically forbidden). However, the connection between these facilitators and the act being commanded or prohibited is made intellectually and appreciated in practice. In this way, these facilitators should be considered obligatory from a purely deductive and experiential perspective, so as not to imply that the One issuing commands actually intended to independently obligate these secondary acts, punishing and rebuking those that abandon them.

It is because of this that scholars have argued regarding the validity of the judicial principle: All secondary acts that facilitate the completion of an obligation are themselves considered obligations, regardless of whether the obligation is interpreted as legislative or purely deductive (as aforementioned). Or does this statement require the caveat of the servant actually being capable of enacting these secondary facilitating acts? The majority of scholars use the first statement (without the caveat of capability), with only some of their contemporaries using the caveat. In actuality, such conditions are not needed because if a person lacks the ability to perform an obligation’s secondary facilitating act, then the original command ceases to be an obligation with respect to him anyways. In this way, the ability to carry out the secondary facilitating act should be considered a veritable prerequisite upon which the instating of the obligation upon him is contingent, not that the ability to enact the secondary facilitator is a condition of actually fulfilling an obligation (which is implied when this statement is made with the caveat mentioned).